Poulsen v. Poulsen : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1992
Poulsen v. Poulsen : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jan Graham; Utah Attorney General; Renee M. Jimenez; Assistant Attorney General; Michael
Poulsen; Attorney for Appellee.
Lynn Poulsen; Appellant (Pro Se).
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Poulsen v. Poulsen, No. 920701 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/3673
r 
"iJtC.H i 
^ < 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
^0 lO±OPr 
MICHAEL POULSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LYNN POULSEN, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
the Department of Human Services, 
Intervenor/Appellee. 
Case No. 920701-CA 
Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE STATE OF UTAH 
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG, DISTRICT JUDGE, PRESIDING 
LYNN POULSEN 
3353 South Main Street #227 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Appellant (Pro Se) 
JAN GRAHAM #1231 
Utah Attorney General 
RENEE M. JIMENEZ #5974 
Assistant Attorney General 
Human Services Division 
120 North 200 West, 4th Floor 
P. 0. Box 1980 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-1980 
(801) 538-4660 
Attorneys for Appellee State 
of Utah 
MICHAEL POULSEN 1/ 
5235 Glendon Street, #W-1 
Murray, Utah 84123 
MAY 2 7 1993 
Plaintiff (Pro Se) 
«*<3. S 
*/• MaryT Noonan 
I Clerk of the Court 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MICHAEL POULSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LYNN POULSEN, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
the Department of Human Services, 
Intervenor/Appellee. 
Case No. 920701-CA 
Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE STATE OF UTAH 
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG, DISTRICT JUDGE, PRESIDING 
LYNN POULSEN 
3353 South Main Street #227 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
JAN GRAHAM #1231 
Utah Attorney General 
RENEE M. JIMENEZ #5974 
Assistant Attorney General 
Human Services Division 
120 North 200 West, 4th Floor 
P. 0. Box 1980 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-1980 
(801) 538-4660 
Attorneys for Appellee State 
of Utah 
MICHAEL POULSEN 
5235 Glendon Street, #w-l 
Murray, Utah 84123 
Appellant (Pro Se) Plaintiff (Pro Se) 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
JURISDICTION 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 2 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, REGULATIONS AND RULES 4 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 4 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 7 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 10 
ARGUMENT 12 
POINT I 
MS. POULSEN'S ATTEMPT TO APPEAL THE DISTRICT 
COURT ORDERS ALLOWING THE STATE TO INTERVENE AND 
SETTING ASIDE THE ORDER TO WITHHOLD AND DELIVER 
IS UNTIMELY AND THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO 
CONSIDER IT 12 
POINT II 
IF MS. POULSEN'S APPEAL IS FROM THE DENIAL OF 
HER RULE 60(b) MOTION, THEN IT FAILS BECAUSE SHE 
HAS NOT SHOWN THAT THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS 
DISCRETION IN DENYING IT 14 
POINT III 
EVEN IF THE DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER GRANTING THE 
STATE'S MOTION TO INTERVENE HAD BEEN TIMELY 
APPEALED, THE DISTRICT COURT ACTED CORRECTLY IN 
GRANTING THAT MOTION 15 
POINT IV 
EVEN IF THE DISTRICT COURT'S ORDEF '-.ANTING THE 
STATE'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER TO WITHHOLD 
AND DELIVER HAD BEEN TIMELY APPEALED, THE DISTRICT 
COURT ACTED CORRECTLY IN GRANTING THAT MOTION 27 
i 
POINT V 
MS. POULSEN RAISES SEVERAL MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES 
WHICH EITHER LACK MERIT OR ARE RAISED FOR THE 
FIRST TIME ON APPEAL AND SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED . . . . 30 
CONCLUSION 35 
ADDENDUM 36 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES: 
Blodgett v. Zions First Nat. Bank, 752 P. 2d 901 
(Utah App. 1988) 34 
Fackrell v. Fackrell, 740 P. 2d 1318 (Utah 1987) 2, 13 
Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake, 817 P. 2d 816 
(Utah 1991) 31 
Johnson v. Johnson, 634 P. 2d 877 (Wash. 1981) 20 
Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P. 2d 1148 (Utah 1989) 33 
Katz v. Pierce, 732 P. 2d 92 (Utah 1986) 14 
Leet v. Leet. 624 S.W. 2d 21 (Mo. 1981) 20 
Likover v. Cleveland, 396 N.E. 2d 491 (Ohio 1978) 26 
New Salem State Bank v. Schultze. 209 P. 599 (Mont. 1922). . . 25 
Pilcher v. State Dept. of Social Services, 663 P. 2d 450 
(Utah 1983) 34 
Rollins v. Petersen. 813 P. 2d 1156 (Utah 1991) 3 
State v. Anderson, 789 P. 2d 27 (Utah 1990) 33 
State v. Johnson. 821 P.2d 1150 (Utah 1991) 3 
State v. Pierce. 655 P. 2d 676 (Utah 1982) 33 
ii 
State of Utah v. Archambeau, 820 P. 2d 920 
(Utah App. 1991) 32, 33 
State ex. rel. Westlake et.al. v. District Court, 
167 P. 2d 588 (Mont. 1946) 25 
Sun Valley Water Beds v. Hughes & Sons, 782 P. 2d 188 
(Utah 1989) 31 
Wehunt v. Ledbetter, 875 F. 2d 1558 (11th Cir. 1988) 20 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5 (3) (1992) 27 
Utah Code Ann. S62A-11-104 (1) (1989 & Supp. 1992) 18 
Utah Code Ann. S62A-11-106 (1) (1989) 21 
Utah Code Ann. S62A-11-401 (1989 & Supp. 1992) 5, 8 
Utah Code Ann. S62A-11-402 (1989 & Supp. 1992) 28 
Utah Code Ann. S62A-11-404 (1989 & Supp. 1992) . . 11, 28, 31-34 
Utah Code Ann. S62A-11-404 (2) (c) (1989 & Supp. 1992) . . . . 28 
Utah Code Ann. S62A-11-404 (2) (d) (1989 & Supp. 1992) . . . . 29 
Utah Code Ann. S62A-11-404.5 (1989 & Supp. 1992) 28 
Utah Code Ann. S62A-11-406 (1989 & Supp. 1992) 29 
Utah Code Ann. S62A-11-407 (1989) 29 
Utah Code Ann. S62A-11-414 (1989) 12, 31, 34 
Utah Code Ann. S63-46b-l .] )-(22) (1989 & Supp. 1992). . . . 28 
Utah Code Ann. §§78-2a-3^) (i) (Supp. 1992) 1 
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-9 (2) (1992) 21 
iii 
42 U.S.C. §601-617 (1991 & Supp. 1993) 17 
42 U.S.C. §602 (b) (1991 & Supp. 1993) 16 
42 U.S.C. §602 (a) (27) (1991 & Supp. 1993) 16 
42 U.S.C. §602 (26) (A) (1991 &. Supp. 1993) 17 
42 U.S.C. §604 (1991 & Supp. 1993) 17 
42 U.S.C. §651-669 (1991 & Supp. 1993) 16 
42 U.S.C. §654 (3) (1991 & Supp. 1993) 16 
42 U.S.C. §654 (4) (1991 & Supp. 1993) 17 
42 U.S.C. §654 (6) (1991 & Supp. 1993) 18 
42 U.S.C. §666 (a) (1) (1991 & Supp. 1993) 27 
42 U.S.C. §666 (b) (1991 & Supp. 1993) 28 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 
45 C.F.R. §302.33(a) (1992) 18 
Utah R. Civ. P. 5 24 
Utah R. Civ. P. 5 (b) (1) 24 
Utah R. Civ. P. 24 (a) (1) 21 
Utah R. Civ. P. 24 (a) (2) 22 
Utah P. Civ. P. 24 (c) 24 
Utah R. Civ. P. 60 (b) 6, 9, 10, 12-15, 31 
Utah R. App. P. 4 (a) 13 
Utah R. App. P. 4 (b) 14 
Utah R. App. P. 24 (a) (6) 4 
iv 
OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED 
Utah Const, art. I, §11 31 
S. Rep. No. 93-1356, 93d Cong., 2nd Sess. (1974) 20 
S. Rep. No. 96-336, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1980) 20 
JURISDICTION 
This appeal arises from proceedings in a domestic relations 
case. The notice of appeal filed by Ms. Poulsen states that she 
is appealing from the district court's "final judgement denying 
Defendant's Motion for Relief from Order Granting State's Right 
to Intervene and or Set Aside State's Motion to Set Aside 
Withhold and Deliver." This refers to the district court's order 
of September 22, 1992 denying Ms. Poulsen's motion to set aside 
made pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2a-3 (2) (i) (Supp. 1992), the 
Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the appeal from that 
order denying Ms. Poulsen's motion to set aside. 
Ms. Poulsen also appears to be appealing the underlying 
district court orders which she asked the district court to set 
aside in her Rule 60(b) motion. Those orders consisted of an 
order c ted August 7, 1992, granting the State's motion to 
nterv *, and an order dated September 3, 1992, granting the 
State's motion to set aside an order to withhold and deliver. 
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Ms, Poulsen did not file a timely appeal of these orders and the 
Court of Appeals lacks jurisdiction to consider those issues on 
appeal. 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Does this court have jurisdiction over the district 
court's orders allowing the State to intervene and setting aside 
the order to withhold and deliver, when the appeal was filed more 
than 30 days after the orders were entered? 
This is an issue regarding this court's jurisdiction to 
consider the appeal, and was not an issue in the proceedings 
below. There is no applicable standard of review. 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion by denying 
Ms. Poulsen's Rule 60(b) motion? 
A trial court's decision on a motion under Rule 60(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure will not be disturbed on appeal 
unless the appellant demonstrates that the trial court abused its 
discretion in reaching its decision. Fackrell v. Fackrell, 740 
P.2d 1318 (Utah 1987). 
3. Did the district court act correctly in granting the 
State's motion to intervene in this action? 
This issue presents a question of law, which this court 
reviews for correctness, giving no particular deference to the 
2 
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not raised before the trial court were not decided by the trial 
court, so there is no applicable standard of review. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES. REGULATIONS AND RULES 
The following statutes, regulations and rules are 
determinative of this case: (Pursuant to Rule 24 (a) (6) of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, see Addendum for text.) 
1. Utah Code Ann. S62A-11-104 (1), (7) (1989 & Supp. 1992) 
2. Utah Code Ann. §62A-11-106 (1) (1989) 
3. Utah Code Ann. §62A-ll-404 (1989 & Supp. 1992) 
4. Utah Code Ann. S62A-11-414 (1989) 
5. 42 U.S.C. §654(6) 
6. 45 C.F.R. §302.33(a) (1992) 
7. Utah R. Civ. P. 24 (a) 
8. Utah R. Civ. P. 24 (c) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On March 27, 1992, the district court entered a divorce 
decree in a proceeding filed by Mr. Poulsen against Ms. Poulsen. 
(R. 125-129.) On June 30, 1992, the district court signed an 
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order to withhold and deliver on the basis of an ex parte motion 
i i ' u M i J i - 1 1 ) I" 1 I I , HI, HI 1 1 1 i1 I'I 1 1 i ill in 
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m o t i o n , (h 318-33^ | hi August ". „ 14*-*;, l h e c o u r t s i g n e d an 
o r d e r gt a i i t i iu i I IK.-1 Lil.dli " !• iiml i in In inli M'um ill"1 Ml'i IMI l 
lin or a b o u t J u l y 2J , 1992, t h e S t a t e a l s o f i l e d and s e r v e d 
upon t h e p a r t i e s a mot ion and snppor t inc i memorandum a s k i n g t h e 
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Commissioner Thomas N Arnett, Ji. Ms. Poulsen and Mr, Poulsen 
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. - ^ _ _ _ i 
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On August 24, 1992, before the entry of a district court 
order approving the commissioner's recommendations, Ms. Poulsen 
appealed to the Court of Appeals from those recommendations. (R. 
419.) The case number of that appeal was No. 920593-CA. The 
Department filed a motion for summary disposition with the Court 
of Appeals on October 9, 1992. The Court of Appeals summarily 
dismissed that appeal on November 9, 1992 on jurisdictional 
grounds. 
On September 3, 1992, the district judge signed the order 
granting the Department's motion to set aside the order to 
withhold and deliver. (R. 443-445*) 
On September 1, 1992, while the appeal in No. 920593-CA was 
pending, and prior to the entry of the September 3, 1992 district 
court order, Ms. Poulsen filed with the district court a document 
entitled "Motion for Relief from Order Granting State's Right to 
Intervene and or Set Aside State's Motion to Set Aside Withhold 
and Deliver." (R. 427-429.) That motion states that it was being 
made pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
On September 22, 1992, the district court entered an order 
denying that motion. (R. 451.) On October 21, 1992, Ms. Poulsen 
filed a notice of appeal from the district court's order denying 
the motion for relief she had filed pursuant to Rule 60(b). 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Oi 1 March ?V 1992, the d i s t r ic t court entered u divorce 
decree :i n a p r o c e e d i n q f i l e d by Mi P o u l s e n a g a i n s t Ml' P a u l s e n . 
(I !: I ,'"i IJ1J | "' ei.'iet; j e q u i i o i Hi I nil.1 in Mi |>ii| i l i i l l d 
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wi i ;. J I. i.l a in] d e l i i /er a HI J & uluu i I I IM I s r t : ::: • i. ii :ii t l ii i ::: J • ::i a::i: 1 ::i 
deliver to the district judge, who signed the order on June ?A. 
"! ":^ ' I1-1 ?(>', ?rf\ | Tlie order " ( wlthho] d and del i ver required 
jr -u..sen <~ iu^^ve, I i i ill! 
:._s i nrome a: * : eer *•* . \\. s» * , 
Department : : Human ^trrvices, Offi* € ; t,. ...^  St. ,..t * ^  
"Off-'"- x* • - ! - ' • ^..pprM rasp a: \ enl )rce his c^ ; *d 
suppor 
ri:i'J Mr P O U : H « :I t -HV-.. never it*. -- -e;i pubi . a S M S t d i n t li J *
 :* 
State of Utah, Mr. Poulsen wanted the Office to collect iiis 
child suppoi l ""„'"!,'"! j yd I inn I ,"' inediib I i nrPiiH-' ,I,M I h'ho I d i X\K\ . 
M M J u l y l} "\, I"'! i,«" after opening a child support; i -~~ at Mr. 
Poulsen*s request, the State mailed to Ms Poulsen and * , 
Poulsen an ex parte motion - iu|eihei 'tl 
unsigned proposed order granting the motion to ii vene. The 
- ^  tiled Ill-1 xrument • u the court. (R. 346-350.j The 
7 
motion set forth the procedural basis for the motion, the grounds 
for intervention and the requested relief. Ms. Poulsen then 
filed written objections to the State's motion to intervene. (R. 
338-339.) On August 7, 1992, the court signed an order granting 
the State's motion to intervene. (R. 346-350.) 
When the Department mailed its motion to intervene to Ms. 
Poulsen and Mr. Poulsen, it also mailed to them a motion and 
supporting memorandum asking the court to set aside the order to 
withhold and deliver previously obtained by Ms. Poulsen, alleging 
that such order did not conform to the requirements of Utah law. 
(R. 327-333.) The Department also mailed them a notice that the 
motion to set aside the order to withhold and deliver would be 
heard before Domestic Relations Commissioner Thomas N. Arnett, 
Jr. on August 19, 1992. (R. 336-337.) 
The Department's motion to set aside the order to withhold 
and deliver came on for hearing as scheduled. Ms. Poulsen and 
Mr. Poulsen were both present, representing themselves. 
Commissioner Arnett recommended that the Department's motion to 
set aside the order to withhold and deliver be granted. The 
Commissioner further recommended that the Department be ordered 
to prepare an order of income withholding pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 62A-11-401 et sea. (1989 & Supp. 1992) (R. 401.) On 
August 21, 1992 the Office issued a Notice to Withhold to Mr. 
8 
Poulsen's employer, EnviroTech Molded Products, and began 
enforcement of Mr. Poulsen's child support obligation. 
On August 24, 1992, before the entry of a district court 
order approving the commissioner's recommendations, Ms. Poulsen 
appealed to the Court of Appeals from those recommendations. (R. 
419.) The case number of that appeal was No. 920593-CA. The 
Department filed a motion for summary disposition with the Court 
of Appeals on October 9, 1992. The Court of Appeals summarily 
dismissed that appeal on November 9, 1992 on the grounds that it 
was not timely filed and that the Court of Appeals lacked 
jurisdiction to consider it. 
On September 3, 1992, the district judge signed the order 
granting the Department's motion to set aside the order to 
withhold and deliver. (R. 443-445.) 
On September 1, 1992, while the appeal in No. 920593-CA was 
pending, and prior to the entry of the September 3, 1992 district 
court order, Ms. Poulsen filed with the district court a document 
entitled "Motion for Relief from Order Granting State's Right to 
Intervene and or Set Aside State's Motion to Set Aside Withhold 
and Deliver." (R. 427-429.) That motion states that it was being 
made pursuant to Vale 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
On September 2) 592, the district court entered an order 
denying that motion. (R. 451.) On October 21, 1992, Ms. Poulsen 
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filed a notice of appeal from the district court's order denying 
the motion for relief she had filed pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Although Ms. Poulsen purports to be appealing the denial of 
her Rule 60(b) motion, it is clear that she is actually trying to 
appeal the order granting the State's motion to set aside the 
order to withhold and deliver, and the court's previous order 
allowing the State to intervene in the case. The order granting 
the State's motion to set aside the order to withhold and deliver 
was entered September 3, 1992. Ms. Poulsen's appeal was filed on 
October 21, 1992, more than thirty days after the entry of the 
order, so this court lacks jurisdiction over her appeal of those 
orders. The filing of Ms. Poulsen's motion under Rule 60(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure did not extend her time for 
filing an appeal of those orders. 
Ms. Poulsen did file her notice of appeal within thirty days 
after the entry of the order denying her Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) 
motion. This court has jurisdiction over that portion of the 
appeal. However, its review is limited to the question of 
whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Ms. 
10 
Poulsen's Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion. Ms. Poulsen has failed 
to show such abuse, and the appeal should be dismissed. 
Even if this court did have jurisdiction to consider the 
underlying orders permitting the State to intervene and setting 
aside Ms. Poulsen's order to withhold and deliver, the district 
court acted correctly in making those orders. The State, through 
its Department of Human Services, Office of Recovery Services, is 
required by federal law to open a child support enforcement case 
at the request of either parent, whether or not the children have 
been receiving public assistance. The State has a strong 
interest in joining into divorce actions, so that it may lessen 
the cost to the public of welfare dependency and ensure that the 
child support is established and enforced as required by federal 
and state law. Utah law gives the Department the right to 
intervene in divorce actions. The State followed proper 
procedure and afforded due process to Ms. Poulsen in this case. 
The district court also acted properly in setting aside the 
order to withhold and deliver obtained by Ms. Poulsen. That 
order did not comply with important statutory requirements, and 
needed to be replaced by a corrected order. The State followed 
proper procedures in obtaining that order to set aside the -der 
to withhold and deliver, and affords due process to Ms. K-^lsen. 
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Ms. Poulsen asserts that Utah Code Ann. S62A-11-404 (1989 & 
Supp. 1992) and Utah Code Ann. S62A-11-414 (1989), which deal 
with the establishment of income withholding to collect child 
support, unconstitutionally deny her access to the courts. This 
assertion is incorrect. These statutes simply provide an 
additional remedy to the common law remedies available to Ms. 
Poulsen. Ms. Poulsen also raises a number of issues which are 
presented for the first time on this appeal and should not be 
considered by the court. 
This court should dismiss this appeal to the extent it 
purports to challenge the orders granting intervention and 
setting aside Ms. Poulsen's order to withhold and deliver, and it 
should affirm the district court's order denying Ms. Poulsen's 
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
MS. POULSEN'S ATTEMPT TO APPEAL THE DISTRICT COURT 
ORDERS ALLOWING THE STATE TO INTERVENE AND SETTING 
ASIDE THE ORDER TO WITHHOLD AND DELIVER IS UNTIMELY 
AND THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER IT. 
The notice of appeal filed by Ms. Poulsen on October 21, 
1992 states that she is appealing from the "final judgement 
denying Defendant's Motion for Relief from Order Granting State's 
Right to Intervene and or Set Aside State's Motion to Set Aside 
12 
Withhold and Deliver, by the Honorable David S. Young on 22 
September 1992." (R. 451.) A reading of Ms- Poulsen's brief, 
however, shows that she is really attempting to appeal the order 
(entered August 7, 1992) granting the State's motion to intervene 
and the order (entered September 3, 1992) granting the State's 
motion to set aside the order to withhold and deliver. (R. 346-
348 and 443-445.) 
Under the Rules of Appellate Procedure, a notice of appeal 
must be filed within 30 days after the date of entry of the 
judgment being appealed from. Utah R. App. P. 4 (a). The time 
for Ms. Poulsen to file an appeal from the order of intervention 
and the order setting aside the withhold and deliver order 
expired 30 days after September 3, 1992. Since she did not file 
a notice of appeal until October 21, 1992, and did not obtain an 
extension of time to appeal, her appeal of those orders is 
untimely and this court lacks jurisdiction over it. 
Ms. Poulsen's Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion did not extend or 
toll the time for her to file an appeal of those orders from 
which she was asking the court to grant relief. "A Rule 60(b) 
motion does not extend or toll the thirty-day period in which 
appeals to the original ar ion must be filed." Fackrell v, 
Fackrell, 740 P.2d 1318, 1319 (Utah 1987). The only p t-
judgment motions which extend the time for filing an appeal are 
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enumerated in Rule 4 (b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, and Utah R. Civ. P. 60 (b) motions are not listed 
there. 
Accordingly, since this appeal is actually an attempt to 
appeal the order of intervention and the order setting aside the 
order to withhold and deliver, and since there has been no timely 
appeal of those orders, this court should dismiss this entire 
appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 
POINT II 
IF MS. POULSEN'S APPEAL IS FROM THE DENIAL OF HER 
RULE 60(b) MOTION, THEN IT FAILS BECAUSE SHE HAS 
NOT SHOWN THAT THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS 
DISCRETION IN DENYING IT. 
A party appealing the denial of a Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) 
motion has a heavy burden. She must marshal the evidence and 
demonstrate that the lower court abused its discretion. 
Otherwise, the appellate court may not disturb the order of the 
trial court. 
This standard of review is stated in Katz v. Pierce, 732 
P.2d 92 (Utah 1986). In Katz, the lower court entered a default 
order against the defendants and awarded the plaintiff a monetary 
judgment. The defendants filed a motion to set aside the 
judgment under rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The lower court denied the motion and the defendants appealed. 
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The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the lower court in part by 
holding that M[t]he district court judge is vested with 
considerable discretion under Rule 60(b) in granting or denying a 
motion to set aside a judgment." Id,, at 93. Furthermore, the 
Court stated that ". . . before we will interfere with the trial 
court's exercise of discretionf abuse of that discretion must be 
clearly shown." (emphasis added.) Id. Ms. Poulsen has not shown 
that the district court abused its discretion in denying her 
motion to set aside its earlier orders. Her brief gives cursory 
attention, at best, to the denial of her Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) 
motion. Instead, it focuses entirely on the earlier orders from 
which she did not take a timely appeal. Ms. Poulsen has failed 
to meet the standard of review and her appeal should be 
dismissed. 
POINT III 
EVEN IF THE DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER GRANTING 
THE STATE'S MOTION TO INTERVENE HAD BEEN TIMELY 
APPEALED, THE DISTRICT COURT ACTED CORRECTLY IN 
GRANTING THAT MOTION 
Even if the district court's order granting the State's 
motion to intervene had been timely appealed, the district court 
acted correctly in granting that motion. 
15 
A. Federal law requires the Department to open a child 
support case at the request of either parent, regardless of 
whether the Department is providing public assistance for the 
children. 
Part D of Title IV of the federal Social Security Act (42 
U.S.C. § 651-669 (1991 & Supp. 1993), hereinafter sometimes 
referred to as Title IV-D) requires, among other things, that all 
states participating in the Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children program ("AFDC") set up a plan for collecting child 
support from responsible parents. As part of such plan, each 
state is required to designate a single organizational unit to 
administer the IV-D program- 42 U.S.C- § 654 (3) (1991 & Supp. 
1993). 
The AFDC program is jointly funded by the federal government 
and participating states. As a condition of state participation 
in the AFDC program, the State is required to administer the 
program according to a plan approved by the United States 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) the federal agency 
charged with regulating the program. 42 U.S.C. § 602 (b) (1991 & 
Supp. 1993). The State's plan must conform to federal 
requirements, one of which is that the State must have in effect 
an approved Title IV-D plan and must operate "a child support 
program in substantial compliance with such plan." 42 U.S.C. § 
602 (a) (27) (1991 & Supp. 1993). 
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The State of Utah participates in the AFDC program (found in 
Part A of Title IV of the Social Security Act [42 U.S.C. §601-617 
(1991 & Supp. 1993)] )f so it is required by Title IV-D to have 
such a child support plan in effect. The organizational unit 
designated by the State of Utah to administer the program is the 
Office of Recovery Services, within the Department of Human 
Services. 
A state's failure to operate a IV-D child support program in 
compliance with mandatory federal requirements would place the 
state's AFDC program in financial jeopardy. Under 42 U.S.C. § 
604 (1991 & Supp. 1993), HHS could disapprove the state's AFDC 
plan and withdraw federal financial participation from the state. 
The states are subjected to periodic federal audits to ensure 
that they are complying with the requirements of Title IV-D. 
One of the requirements of Title IV-D is that a state must 
provide child support services for the benefit of all children, 
regardless of whether or not they are receiving AFDC benefits. 
The State provides child support services as a matter of course 
in AFDC cases because the custodial parent must assign his or her 
child support rights to the State as a condition of receiving 
public assistance for the children 42 U.S.C. §§ 602 (26) (A) 
(1991 & Supp. 1993), §65' (4) (19- & Supp. 1993). In such 
cases, the State attempts to recoup its AFDC expenditures by 
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collecting support from the non-custodial parent. In addition, 
however, any non-AFDC recipient may open a IV-D case by making 
application to the state IV-D agency and paying any necessary 
application fee; state IV-D agencies must provide the same 
services in both AFDC and non-AFDC cases. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 651 
and 654 (6) (1991 & Supp. 1993); 45 C.F.R. § 302.33 (a) (1991 & 
Supp. 1993). 
Furthermore, the right to open a IV-D case is not limited to 
custodial parents. As the federal law provides, any individual, 
whether he or she is a custodial parent or non-custodial parent, 
may open a child support case with the Office. 42 U.S.C. 654(6) 
(1991 & Supp. 1993); 45 C.F.R. § 302.33(a) (1992). 
Utah's laws are in full compliance with the federal 
requirements described above. For example, Utah Code Ann. § 62A-
11-104 (1) (1989 & Supp. 1992) establishes that the Office has 
the duty to collect child support in both AFDC and non-AFDC 
cases. The right to open a IV-D case is not limited to custodial 
parents; either parent may apply. Although most individuals who 
ask the Office to open a child support case are custodial 
parents, some are non-custodial parents. In the present case, 
for example, Mr. Poulsen, the non-custodial parent, requested 
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that the Office open a non-AFDC child support case and enforce 
his child support obligation. (R. 264-269.) One possible reason 
a non-custodial parent might have for opening a IV-D case might 
be a desire to have child support collected in an orderly manner 
by a state agency which specializes in child support enforcement 
and has an accurate system of keeping records of child support 
payments made. 
The Office of Recovery Services is required to collect child 
support when a custodial parent opens a IV-D case, even though 
the non-custodial parent may be opposed to having the Office 
enforce his child support obligation. Similarly, even though Ms. 
Poulsen, a custodial parent, is opposed to having the Office 
collect her child support, and speculates that she could collect 
child support more effectively using her own devices, the Office 
is required to be involved because Mr. Poulsen has opened a IV-D 
case and requested that it collect his child support obligation. 
This involvement by the Office does not in any way restrict the 
child support remedies available to Ms. Poulsen; nothing in the 
law prevents her from taking appropriate child support 
enforcement actions against Mr. Poulsen either on her own or 
t;:rough a private attorney. 
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B. The State has an important interest in collecting child 
support in non-AFDC cases as well as AFDC cases, and it had the 
right to intervene in this divorce proceeding. 
The State has an important interest in collecting child 
support in non-AFDC cases as well as AFDC cases. The 
beneficiaries of the State's actions are the children who need 
financial support in a divorce situation. Certainly the State 
has an extremely important parens patriae function in working to 
see that all children, whether they be needy or not, receive 
support from their non-custodial parents. 
One of the legislative purposes behind the IV-D statute was 
to provide child support services to all persons, not just AFDC 
recipients, so that many families could avoid the necessity of 
applying for public assistance in the first place. See, for 
example, Senate (Finance Committee) Report Rep. No. 93-1356, 93d 
Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Congressional and 
Administrative News 8133, 8145; Semate Report No. 96-336, 96th 
Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Congressional and 
Administrative News 1448, 1526-27; Wehunt v. Ledbetter, 875 F.2d 
1558 (11th Cir. 1988); Leet v. Leet, 624 S.W.2d 21 (Mo. 1981); 
and Johnson v. Johnson, 634 P.2d 877 (Wash 1981). 
Whenever the State opens a IV-D case, whether by virtue of 
an assignment of child support rights (in an AFDC situation), or 
at the request of either parent (in a non-AFDC situation), it 
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becomes a real party in interest with regard to any judicial 
proceeding involving the child support obligations being 
enforced. In such a case, if the State needs to take judicial 
action to fulfill its duty to establish or enforce child support, 
then it has a right to intervene in the divorce case so that it 
may take that action. In cases in which the Department has 
provided public assistance for the children, Utah Code Ann. §78-
45-9 (2) (1992) requires joinder of the Department into a pending 
judicial child support case. 
In a non-AFDC case, like the case at bar, Utah Code Ann. 
§78-45-9 (2) (1992) does not apply because public assistance has 
never been provided to the children. Instead, the State's 
unconditional right to intervene is founded in Utah Code Ann. 
S62A-11-106 (1) (1989), which gives the Office the right to 
". . . file judicial proceedings as a real party in interest to 
establish, modify, and enforce a court order in the name of the 
state, any department of the state, the office, or an obligee to 
collect support." (emphasis added). In accordance with Rule 24 
(a) (1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires the 
court to permit intervention when a statute confers an 
unconditional right to intervene, the State is entitled to 
intervene in judicial child support actiom ^s a matter of right 
in non-AFDC cases. 
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Even if the State did not have an unconditional statutory 
right to intervene in judicial child support actions when public 
assistance has not been provided, it nonetheless has the right to 
intervene under Rule 24(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. This rule requires the court to allow intervention as 
a matter of right when: 
the applicant claims an interest relating to the 
property or transaction which is the subject of the 
action and he is so situated that the disposition of 
the action may as a practical matter impair or impede 
his ability to protect that interest unless the 
applicant's interest is adequately represented by 
existing parties, 
Utah R. Civ. P. 24 (a) (2). 
As is set forth above, the State has a significant interest 
in establishing and enforcing child support when a person not 
receiving public assistance requests that it open a IV-D case and 
carry out its child support enforcement duties. If the State 
were not permitted to intervene in such cases, the disposition of 
the action might as a practical matter impair or impede its 
ability to protect that interest. Unless the State is a party to 
such actions, it cannot fulfill its duty of ensuring that Utah's 
child support program is properly carried out, whether its 
involvement is needed in obtaining the proper amount of child 
support in an initial support order, in modifying the support 
amount where appropriate, or, as in this case, in ensuring that 
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the correct procedures for child support enforcement are in 
place. 
In addition to the State's general interest described above, 
the State has a specific interest in the present case because the 
withhold and deliver order (R. 258) prepared by Ms. Poulsen fails 
to include certain provisions required by statute and fails to 
direct that payments be made through the Office of Recovery 
Services as required by law. (See discussion under Point IV.) 
The absence of these important provisions prevented the 
Department from carrying out its duty to use income withholding 
procedures to enforce Mr, Poulsen's child support obligation. 
The Department had the duty to obtain a new order that complied 
with statutory requirements, and before it could do so, it was 
necessary for it to intervene in the divorce action. 
The State's interest would not be properly protected or 
represented if it were not permitted to intervene in divorce 
proceedings when it needs to take judicial action in the 
performance of its IV-D responsibilities in non-AFDC cases. 
Neither parent is authorized to act on behalf of the State; the 
State must be made a party in order to protect its interests. 
For t -se reasons, the State was entitled to intervene in 
the divorv. j^oceedings between Mr. Poulsen and Ms. Poulsen. 
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C. The procedures followed by the Department in obtaining 
the order joining it as an intervenor were in compliance with 
procedural rules and principles of due process of law. 
In addition to satisfying the substantive criteria giving it 
the right to intervene, the Department complied with procedural 
rules and principles of due process of law in making its motion 
to intervene in this case. 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure specify the following 
simple procedure for intervention. The rule provides that "[a] 
person desiring to intervene shall serve a motion to intervene 
upon the parties as provided in Rule 5. The motions shall state 
the grounds therefor and shall be accompanied by a pleading 
setting forth the claim or defense for which intervention is 
sought." Utah R. Civ. P. 24 (c). The procedures followed by the 
Department in intervening into this action fully complied with 
the provisions of this rule. 
The Department served a copy of its motion to intervene upon 
all parties as provided in Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. That rule clearly permits service by mail. See Utah 
R. Civ. P. 5 (b) (1). In this case, since the parties were not 
represented by counsel, the Department acted correctly in mailing 
the notices to them directly. Ms. Poulsen obviously received her 
copy of the motion, because she filed written objections to it. 
(R. 338-339.) 
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The motion to intervene clearly stated the grounds for the 
Department's intervention and explained that the Department was 
seeking relief in the form of the establishment, modification or 
enforcement of a child support order- (R. 346-350.) In addition, 
the Department concurrently mailed to the parties a copy of its 
motion to set aside the order to withhold and deliver, along with 
its supporting memorandum. (R. 327-333.) The parties had ample 
notice of the Department's motion and of the relief it was 
seeking. 
The Department filed its motion to intervene on an ex parte 
basis. In doing so, it acted correctly. Because the law permits 
the Department to intervene in a divorce action as a matter of 
right, it is appropriate that its motions to intervene be handled 
on an ex parte basis. The Department's motions to intervene are 
routine in nature and considerations of judicial economy support 
the idea of resolving them ex parte. Unless a statute or rule 
provides otherwise (and in Utah, there is none), leave to 
intervene may be given on an ex parte application and by an ex 
parte order. See State ex. rel. Westlake v. District Court, 167 
P. 2d 588, 589 (Mont. 1946) and New Salem State Bank v. Schultze, 
209 P. 599 (Mont. 1922). The cour may entertain a ~ion for 
intervention without a formal evidentiary hearing p; : to 
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denying or granting a motion to intervene. Likover v. Cleveland, 
369 N.E. 2d 491 (Ohio 1978). 
Ms. Poulsen argues that her right to due process was 
violated because the order of intervention was granted without a 
" . . . hearing being allowed to the appellant" (Appellant's Br. 
at 8), and that she was denied the right to •• . . . discovery, to 
cross examine witnesses and to compel witnesses in her favor 
. . . ." (Appellant's Br. at 16). Ms. Poulsen is incorrect. 
Nothing in the rules requires a hearing on a motion to intervene. 
In this case, the court's file contained both the Department's 
motion and the appellant's objections prior to the granting of 
the motion. Ms. Poulsen had the opportunity of presenting her 
position to the district court, and was afforded due process of 
law. 
Ms. Poulsen also asserts that the State's motion to 
intervene was untimely because it was made after the divorce 
decree had been entered, and that intervention after judgment 
should only be permitted upon a strong showing after taking into 
consideration all of the circumstances. (Appellant's Br. at 21.) 
In a divorce case, such as this, in which the court has 
continuing jurisdiction to modify its orders, the circumstances 
certainly justify permitting intervention by the State after 
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entry of the decree, to protect its important interests described 
above. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(3) (Supp. 1992). 
POINT IV 
EVEN IF THE DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER GRANTING THE 
STATE'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER TO WITHHOLD 
AND DELIVER HAD BEEN TIMELY APPEALED, THE DISTRICT 
COURT ACTED CORRECTLY IN GRANTING THAT MOTION 
Even if the district court's order granting the State's 
motion to set aside the order to withhold and deliver had been 
timely appealed, the district court acted correctly in granting 
that motion. 
Federal law provides that in order to increase the 
effectiveness of the IV-D child support enforcement program, 
every state participating in that program must have in effect 
laws which provide ". . . for the withholding from income of 
amounts payable as support." 42 U.S.C. § 666 (a) (1). The 
federal law specifies the income withholding procedures the 
states must implement. Among other things, states must require 
that all such withheld income be sent by the employer to a 
designated public agency, or, in the alternative to an entity 
which is publicly accountable and supervised by such public 
agency. The agenc, or entity which receives the withhc income 
is then required to distribute the payments to the child support 
27 
obligee and to maintain accurate records of the payments* 42 
U.S.C. § 666 (b). 
Pursuant to this federal mandate, the Utah legislature 
enacted Part 4 of Title 62A, Chapter 11 of the Utah Code- That 
statute provides for two alternative methods of obtaining an 
income withholding order. First, a child support obligee may 
directly petition the court for an income withholding order. 
Utah Code Ann. § 62A-11-404 (1989 & Supp. 1992). Second, if the 
Office of Recovery Services is enforcing child support under the 
IV-D program, that Office can implement income withholding 
procedures. Utah Code Ann. § 62A-11-404.5 (1989 & Supp. 1992). 
The Legislature noted that because the procedures of Part 4, 
Title 62A, Chapter 11 are mandated by federal law, they shall be 
applied for the purposes specified in that Part and shall control 
over any other statutory administjrative procedures. Utah Code 
Ann. § 62A-11-402 (1989 & Supp. 1992). (Thus Ms. Poulsen's 
numerous references to provisions of the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-l through 63-46b-22 
[1989 and Supp. 1992] are irrelevant.) 
The Legislature has required that in both the IV-D setting 
and in the private setting, an order to withhold income shall 
direct that withheld income be submitted to the Office of 
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Recovery Services. Utah Code Ann. §§ 62A-11-404, -406, and -407 
(1989 and Supp. 1992). 
The order to withhold and deliver obtained by Ms. Poulsen 
failed to contain several provisions required by statute. (R. 
258). Notably, it failed to order Mr. Poulsen's employer to 
remit withheld income to the Office of Recovery Services, as 
required by Utah Code Ann. § 62A-11-404 (2) (c) (1989 & Supp. 
1992). It also failed to order that ORS be given a duplicate of 
the notice to be sent to the employer providing notice of the 
withholding. .Id. Finally, it failed to include a provision 
informing the obligor of the circumstances under which the 
withholding may be terminated, as is required by Utah Code Ann. § 
62A-11-404 (2) (d) (1989 & Supp. 1992). 
Because the order to withhold and deliver prepared by Ms. 
Poulsen failed to comply with important statutory requirements, 
the district court acted correctly in ordering that it be set 
aside and be replaced by a correct order. 
The State followed all procedural rules and afforded due 
process to Ms. Poulsen in seeking and obtaining the order setting 
aside the order to withhold and deliver. Contrary to Ms. 
Poulsen's assertion that the order was granted on an ex parte 
basis (Appellant's Br. at 12), the record shows that it was 
granted after notice and a hearing. On July 23, 1992, the State 
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mailed a copy of its motion, with a supporting memorandum and 
notice of hearing, to both Ms, Poulsen and Mr. Poulsen, and filed 
the originals with the court. (R. 327-333, 336-337) Ms. Poulsen 
obviously received these documents, because she filed a written 
response to them on July 31, 1992 and appeared at the hearing on 
August 19, 1992, at which she spoke in opposition to the motion. 
She has no basis for challenging the procedure followed by the 
State. 
POINT V 
MS. POULSEN RAISES SEVERAL MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES 
WHICH EITHER LACK MERIT OR ARE RAISED FOR THE FIRST 
TIME ON APPEAL AND SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED 
This appeal raises several miscellaneous issues which lack 
merit, supporting authority or are raised for the first time on 
appeal. The issues are best broken into the categories of 
contract law and constitutional law. Under the category of 
contract law are issues regarding the right to contract and 
fraudulent transfer. The constitutional law category includes 
issues involving the right to privacy, civil liberty, economic 
freedom, the right to be free from involuntary servitude, equal 
protection under the law, the right to access the courts and the 
alleged overbreadth or vagueness of a statute. 
Of all these issues, the only one that was properly raised 
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in the proceedings below is Ms, Poulsen's assertion that Utah 
Code Ann. S62A-11-404 (1989 & Supp. 1992) and Utah Code Ann. 
S62A-11-414 (1989) facially violate the open courts clause of the 
Utah Constitution, art. I, § 11. She raised this issue in her 
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion. (R. 427-429.) Legislative 
enactments are presumed constitutional, and Ms. Poulsen has shown 
no basis for rebutting this presumption. See Greenwood v. City 
of North Salt Lake, 817 P. 2d 816 (Utah 1991). 
Ms. Poulsen argues that Utah Code Ann. S62A-11-404 (1989 & 
Supp. 1992) entitled "Procedures for Obligee Seeking Income 
withholding" and Utah Code Ann. §62A-11-414 (1989) entitled 
"Income Withholding upon Obligor's Request" impinge upon her 
right to collect child support and therefore, deny her access to 
the court to remedy an injury. This argument lacks merit. 
Utah's open courts clause, Utah Const, art. 1, §11, limits the 
legislature's authority to enact and repeal laws. The limitation 
is placed upon the legislature so injured persons are not denied 
their common law rights and remedies. See Sun Valley Water Beds 
v. Hughes & Sons, 782 P.2d 188, 191 (Utah 1989). 
In fact, rather than limiting a person's right to collect 
child support, the inc* ne wi .:,holding statute enhances that right 
by providing another collect -<n tool. A person must, of course, 
comply with the requirements of the statute in order to avail 
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herself of the remedy. Among other things, this means that the 
child support payments must be first sent to the Office of 
Recovery Services, which then will distribute them to the 
obligee. Utah Code Ann. § 62A-11-404 (1989 & Supp. 1992). Ms. 
Poulsen continues to have the common law remedies that existed 
before the enactment of these statutes, which provide an 
additional remedy. The income withholding statute certainly does 
not deny any person access to the courts, and it does not violate 
the open courts clause. 
The remaining issues mentioned in Ms. Poulsen's brief were 
not properly raised in the proceedings below. Issues presented 
for the first time on appeal should not be heard. In State of 
Utah v. Archambeau, 820 P. 2d 920 (Utah App. 1991), the court 
reaffirmed the general rule that " . . . a defendant who fails to 
bring an issue before the trial court is barred from asserting it 
initially on appeal." Archambeau, 820 P. 2d at 920. This 
general rule should apply to the issues of contract and 
fraudulent transfer. In the proceedings before the district 
court, Ms. Poulsen did not properly secure her arguments of 
fraudulent transfer or contract. Therefore, she should be barred 
from raising those issues for the first time on appeal. 
Even if Ms. Poulsen had properly raised these contract 
issues, they lack merit, It is obvious that even before the 
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State became involved in this case, the voluntary wage assignment 
arrangement contemplated by the district court in the divorce 
decree had failed to materialize. Ms. Poulsen herself abandoned 
the voluntary wage assignment approach when she sought to avail 
herself of the right tc have an order compelling income 
withholding pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §62A-11~404 (1989 & Supp. 
1992). She should not now be heard to say that the very 
procedure she sought to utilize violates her right to contract. 
Also, Mr. Poulsen's effort to involve the State in collecting his 
child support obligation was not a fraudulent transfer. The 
concept of fraudulent transfer does not even begin to apply to 
such a situation. 
A more specific rule applies to attempts by a party to raise 
constitutional issues for the first time on appeal. The court in 
Archambeau held that a constitutional issue may be heard for the 
first time on appeal if the lower court committed plain error or 
if there are exceptional circumstances. Jjd. To find "plain 
error" it must be clear to the appellate court that the trial 
court was in error and secondly that the error was harmful. See 
State v. Anderson, 789 P. 2d 27, 29 (Utah 1990). The key to 
finding an exceptional circumstance is that failure to hear the 
issue on appeal would result in manifest i^  Jtice. See Jolivet 
v. Cook, 784 P. 2d 1148 (Utah 1989) and State v. Pierce, 655 P. 
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2d 676, 677 (Utah 1982). 
Ms, Poulsen has failed to show either plain error or that 
exceptional circumstances exist with regard to her remaining 
constitutional issues. Furthermore, Ms. Poulsen has failed even 
to adequately support her arguments by statute or case law. 
Therefore, Ms. Poulsen's issues regarding the alleged vagueness 
or overbreadth of Utah Code Ann. §§ 62A-11-404 (1989 & Supp. 
1992) and §62A-11-414 (1989), right to privacy, civil liberty, 
economic freedom, the right to be free from involuntary 
servitude, and equal protection under the law should not be 
considered by this Court. 
Finally, Ms. Poulsen has referred in her brief to evidence 
not admitted in the district court. The courts have routinely 
held that such evidence shall not be considered on appeal. See 
Pilcher v. State Dept. of Social Services, 663 P.2d 450 (Utah 
1983). Ms. Poulsen has attached several exhibits to her brief 
that are not part of the record. For example, exhibits C (page 
7), E, G, and I are not part of the record from the lower court 
and should not be considered by the Court of Appeals. Blodgett 
v. Zions First Nat. Bank, 752 P. 2d 901, 903 n.l (Utah App. 1988) 
(Merely attaching a document to an appellate brief does not make 
the document part of the record.) 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State of Utah respectfully 
requests this Court to affirm the district court's order denying 
Ms. Poulsen's motion to set aside, and to dismiss this appeal to 
the extent it purports to challenge the district court orders 
allowing the State's intervention in the divorce action and 
setting aside the order to withhold and deliver obtained by Ms. 
Poulsen. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this <37&* day of May, 1993. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Utah Attorney General 
RENEE M. JIMENfcZ () 
Assistant Attforney General 
Attorney for State of Utah 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the x/ day of May, 1993, I 
caused to be mailed two (2) true and exact copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellee to Lynn Poulsen, 3353 South Main 
Street, #227, Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 and two (2) true and 
exact copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee to Mr. Michael 
Poulsen, 5235 Glendon Street, #W1, Murray, Ut. 84123 
RENEE M. JIMENE5 
Assistant Attorney Genej 
35 
ADDENDUM 
Determinative Provisions 
Decree of Divorce 
Order to Withhold and Deliver 
State of Utah's Ex Parte Motion to Intervene 
Notice of Objections to State's Ex Parte Motion to 
Intervene 
State of Utah's Order of Intervention 
Motion to Set Aside Order to Withhold and Deliver 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support 
of Motion to Set Aside Order to Withhold and 
Deliver 
Notice of Hearing 
Response to Motion to Set Aside Order to 
Withhold and Deliver and or Motion to Dismiss 
Order Granting State of Utah's Motion to Set Aside 
Order to Withhold and Deliver 
Motion for Relief from Order Granting State's 
Right to Intervene and or Set Aside State's Motion 
to Set Aside Withold (Sic) and Deliver 
Minute Entry 
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DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
The texts of the following statutes and rules are relevant 
to the determination of this case: 
1. Utah Code Ann. §62A-11-104 (1989 & Supp. 1992): Duties of 
Office: 
The Office has the following duties: 
(1) to collect child support from an obligor if the 
department has provided public assistance, or if the 
department has contracted to collect support; 
(7) to implement income withholding for collection of child 
support in accordance with Part 4 of this chapter. 
2. Utah Code Ann. S62A-11-106 (1989): Office may file as a real 
party in interest: 
(1) The Office may file judicial proceedings as a real 
party in interest to establish, modify, and enforce a court 
order in the name of the state, any department of the state, 
the office, or an obligee to collect support. 
3. Utah Code Ann. S62A-11-404 (1989 & Supp. 1992): Procedure 
for obligee seeking income withholding: 
(1) An obligee may apply for income withholding services by 
the office under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act. 
Alternatively, an obligee may seek income withholding in a 
district court of competent jurisdiction, when a delinquency 
occurs under a child support order entered prior to October 
13, 1990, and not modified after that date, if that order 
included authorization of income withholding. With regard 
to child support orders er'ered after October 13, 1990, an 
obligee may seek income withholding in a court of competent 
jurisdiction, when a delinquency occurs, whether or not the 
order included authorization of income withholding. In 
order to proceed with a civil action, the obligee shall 
petition the court for a determination of delinquency and 
for implementation of income withholding procedures. 
(2) When an obligee proceeds with a civil action under this 
section, the court shall: 
(a) make an initial ex parte determination of 
delinquency as defined in this chapter; 
(b) proceed with notice to the obligor, an opportunity 
for hearing, and income withholding procedures similar 
to those required for the office under this part; 
(c) order that, when a payor is notified, a duplicate 
notice be served on the office, and order the payor to 
submit all withheld income to the office; the office 
shall promptly distribute those payments to the 
obligee; and 
(d) designate the circumstances under which an obligor 
may petition the court for termination of income 
withholding procedures. 
(3) If an obligee's child support order does not contain a 
provision authorizing income withholding, the obligee shall 
petition the court for an amendment of the order to include 
that authorization before commencing a civil action under 
this section. 
Utah Code Ann. §62A-11-414 (1989): Income withholding upon 
obligor's request: 
Whether or not an delinquency has occurred, an obligor may 
request that the office implement income withholding 
procedures under this part for payment of his child support 
obligations. 
42 U.S.C. §654(6): State plan for child and spousal 
support: 
A State plan for child and spousal support must — 
(6) provide that (A) the child support collection or 
paternity determination services established under the 
plan shall be made available to any individual not 
otherwise eligible for such services upon application 
filed by such individual with the State, including 
support collection services for the spouse (or former 
spouse) with whom the absent parent's child is living 
(but only if a support obligation has been established 
with respect to such spouse), and only if the support 
obligation established with respect to the child is 
being enforced under the plan,. . * * 
45 C.F.R. §302.33(a) (1992): Individuals not otherwise 
eligible for paternity and support services: 
(a) Availability of Services. (1) The State plan must 
provide that the services established under the plan shall 
be made available to any individual who (i) Files an 
application for the services with the IV-D agency* . . . 
Utah R. Civ. P. 24 (a): Intervention: 
Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to 
intervene in an action: (1) when a statute confers an 
unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant 
claims an interest relating to the property or transaction 
which is the subject of the action and he is so situated 
that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter 
impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, 
unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by 
existing parties. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 24 (c): Procedure: 
A person desiring to intervene shall serve a motion to 
intervene upon the parties as provided in Rule 5. The 
motions shall state the grounds therefore and shall be 
accompanied by a pleading setting forth the claim or 
defense for which intervention is sought. 
PHILIP C. STORY (3869) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
50 West Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone (801) 533-8999 
FILEBOtSTWCT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
MAR 2 7 892 
^COUNTY 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL D. POULSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LYNN J. POULSEN. 
Defendant. 
2H3I43 
Case No. 914901255 
Judge David S. Young 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
The above-entitled action came on for hearing on January 13, 1992, before the 
Commissioner Sandra N. Peuler of the above entitled Court The Plaintiff was present and 
represented by his attorney, Philip C Story. Defendant was present and represented by her 
attorney Judith Wolbach. 
The parties entered into a stipulation in open court that Defendant's default could 
be entered and which resolved all issues raised by the pleadings. The stipulation was read 
into the record, orally a ented to by the parties and ; pproved by the Commissioner. 
The Commissioi^r then heard the testimoi*# Plaintiff of evidence in support of 
Plaintiffs Complaint and based upon the testimony of Plaintiff, the pleadings on file and the 
balance of the record herein and now being fully advised in the premises, having heretofore 
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Plaintiff is awarded a Decree of Divorce from the Defendant upon the grounds 
of irreconcilable differences of the marriage. 
2. The parties have six minor children born as issue of this marriage to-wit: K-
LEB POULSEN, who is now sixteen (16) years old; SHILOH POULSEN, who is now 
twelve (12) years old; INSHALLA POULSEN, who is now thirteen (13) years old; 
ELIJAH POULSEN, who is now ten (10) years old; CHEYENNE POULSEN, who is five 
(5) years old; and GREGORY POULSEN, age 10 months. 
3. Custody of K-Leb Poulsen is awarded to Plaintiff. Custody of each of the 
remaining minor children of the parties is awarded to Defendant. The non-custodial parent 
shall be entitled to visitation with the minor children at such times and places as may be 
recommended by LDS Social Services counseling staff after consultation with the parties and 
their children. Each of the parties shall commence counseling with LDS Social Services 
immediately. Each party shall be responsible for his/her own costs of such counselling, if 
any. 
4. Plaintiff shall pay child support to Defendant in the amount of $700.00 per 
month by voluntary wage assignment 
5. Plaintiff shall maintain health and dental insurance for the benefit of the minor 
children as long as such insurance is available to him through his employment at reasonable 
cost If no such insurance is available to Plaintiff but is available to Defendant then she shall 
maintain such insurance upon the same terms. Defendant shall be responsible for routine 
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in lier custody. 
medical and dental care for the minor childrei^  Extraordinary medical and dental expenses 
which are not covered by insurance should be paid by the parties 25% by Defendant and 
75% by Plaintiff. 
6. Pursuant to Utah Code §62A-11-404, income withholding as a means of 
collecting delinquent child support is authorized. 
7. Defendant is awarded alimony in the amount of $200.00 per month which shall 
be paid by wage assignment. 
8. The parties own an interest in real property located at 7236 West 2660 South, 
Magna, Utah, which is used as the family residence. Defendant is awarded said real 
property subject to all indebtedness associated therewith. In exchange for the award to 
Defendant of Plaintiffs share of the equity interest therein, all judgments for fees or support 
obligations or otherwise outstanding amounts owed to Defendant for child support and 
alimony through January 13, 1992, are deemed satisfied and paid in full. 
9. Plaintiff is awarded the Honda motorcycle; welder; hand tools; all items of 
property presently in his possession; all his personal clothing and effects and those of K-Leb 
Poulsen. Defendant is awarded all the household furniture, furnishings and effects; the 
automobiles in her possession; horses; horse trailers and tack and equipment; and tractor 
and equipment 
10. The parties have miscellaneous debts and obligations incurred prior to and 
since their separation. Plaintiff shall pay all pre-separation debts of the parties and the 
unpa' Tiedical expenses associated with the birth of C g^ory Poulsen. Each party shall pay 
the post-separation debts incurred by that party and each shall hold the other harmless from 
3 
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enforcement of payment of debts ordered to be paid by that party. 
11. Defendant is awarded 50% of the amount of employment pension and 
retirement benefits accrued by Plaintiff during the marriage. Such benefits awarded to 
Defendant shall include survivors benefits and be disbursed by QDRO. 
12. Plaintiff shall pay $1,000.00 to Judith Wolbach toward Defendant's attorney 
fees payable at the rate of $100.00 per month without interest and secured by a promissory 
note. 
13. Each party shall execute any and all documents necessary to effectuate the 
provisions of any Decree of Divorce that is awarded. 
14. Each party shall refrain from harassing or harming the other in any way and 
from disparaging the other in the presence or earshot of the minor children. 
15. If there is no income tax owed for 1991 in excess of the amounts withheld or 
Defendant pays any tax owed at the time of filing then the parties shall file joint income tax 
returns for 1991. Plaintiff shall receive any refund and be responsible for any liability for 
that tax year. Plaintiff shall be entitled to claim the personal exemptions pertaining to the 
minor children provided he is current in his child support and alimony obligation for the tax 
year in question. Defendant shall provide Plaintiff with an executed IRS Form 8332 by 
March 15 after the tax year for which Plaintiff is entitled to claim the exemptions. If 
Defendant becomes employed or remarries then the allocation of the tax exemptions for the 
children shall be resolved by agreement between the parties alone or in mediation if they 
are unable to agree on their own. 
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DATED this ffH day of March, 1992. 
cL^CLjkPUx£t^~> 
VJD 5. YOUNG 
District Court Jttdge- co-nv-*v-<-4-d-arvj8--o 
Approved as to Form and Content: 
JUDITH WOLBACH 
Attorney for Defendant 
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Lynn Poulsen 
3353 South Main #227 
Salt Lake City, UTAH 84115 
Risag&TSXTef&sr 
Third JuQicta! District 
JUN 23 1932 
D;.pucyC^w; 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL POULSEN 
PLAINTIFF 
vs. 
LYNN POULSEN 
DEFENDANT 
ORDER FOR WITHOLD AND DELIVER 
CASE NO. 914901255 
JUDGE YOUNG 
This matter was heard Ex-parte on 23rd of June 1992 before 
the Honorable Judge David S. Young, on the Motion of Defendant 
Lynn Poulsen appearing in propria persona and Motion and 
Affidavit being submitted, the Court finds that the Plaintiff is 
chargeable with the sum of $776.80 in arrearages for Child 
Support and Alimony. 
It is hereby Ordered that Plaintiff pay to Defendant by C\* 
Order for Withold and Deliver to be served upon employer, 
Envirotech at 1055 West North Temple the sum of $2Z£i80 from /*4bA***~fi 
Dated this day ^ 2 ^ June 1992. 
By the Court 
Plaintiff's earnings. 
000203 
R. PAUL VAN DAM #3312 
Attorney General 
BY: Renee M. Jimenez 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for State of Utah 
120 North 200 West, 4th Floor 
P.O. Box 1980 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-1980 
Telephone: 538-4660 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL POULSEN, ) STATE OF UTAH'S EX PARTE 
) MOTION TO INTERVENE 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. 
) Civil No. 914901225 
LYNN POULSEN, ) 
) Judge DAVID S. YOUNG 
Defendant. ) 
THE STATE OF UTAH, Department of Human Services (the 
"Department"), through its counsel Renee M. Jimenez, Assistant 
Attorney General, hereby moves the Court, ex parte, for an order: 
A. Joining the Department as an intervenor in this actio 
B. Permitting the Department to file a request for relief 
herein and to proceed in furtherance of that request for relief. 
This motion is based on Rule 24(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, and is supported by the following grounds: 
Third Jidici&l District 
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Deputy Ctefk 
1* The Department has an interest in certain of the 
property and transactions which are the subject of this action, 
because: 
(a) The Department is obligated to provide child 
support enforcement services under 42 U.S.C. S§654(6) or 657(c) 
and related federal laws. 
2. Pursuant to the statutes mentioned above, 
particularly Utah Code Ann. §62A-11-106(1)f and other applicable 
law, the Department is entitled to intervene in this action as a 
real party in interest to establish, modify, and/or enforce a 
child support order. 
DATED this p2/ S day of July, 1992. 
R., PAUL VAN DAM 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
m/?n** T^1- 5)^>*^Z Rehee M. Jimenez^/ ^/ 
Assistant Attorney General 
000350 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on<^ji*~^day of July, 1992/ I 
mailed a true and exact copy of the foregoing Motion and Order to 
Intervene, postage prepaid to the following address(es): 
LYNN POULSEN 
3353 So. Main Street #227 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
MICHAEL POULSEN 
5235 Glendon Street #W1 
Murray, Utah 84123 
DATED this q^^t^-^dav of July, 1992 
Kathleen N. Waterhouse 
SECRETARY 
0003-1S 
Lynn Poulsen illL ^ 
3353 South Main #227 
Salt Lake City, UTAH 84115 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL POULSEN JNOTICE OF OBJECTIONS 
PLAINTIFF )TO STATEfS EX-PARTE 
)MOTI ON TO INTERVENE 
vs. ) 
)CASE NO- 914901255 
LYNN POULSEN ) 
DEFENDANT )JUDGE YOUNG 
Comes Now the Defendant Lynnn Poulsen pursuant to RCP 12 to 
Object to State of Utahfs Intervention into this Divorce Action, 
for the following reasons: 
1. Defendant and her minor children do NOT receive ANY Public 
Assistance of any kind from this State! 
2. Defendants children even attend a private Christian School 
and have never received even "free Public Education11-
3. The Legislative Intent for the use of Office of Recovery 
Services Is to maintain the "integrity of the Public 
Assistance programs" that are supported by the taxpayers of 
this State. 
4- That the taxpayers of this State support "only those In NEED 
and only as a resource of LAST resort" (Utah Code 62A-11-
101). 
5. State seeks to Intervc -. on behalf of the Plaintiff, -? ho has 
a attorney retained and can provide legal remedies If 
Plaintiff feels his rights need to be protected or enforced. 
6. State of Utah, Department of Office of Recovery Services Is 
to be used as a "last resort". 
00033S 
The Plaintiff is not on Public Assistance now and has three 
Incomes coming Into his home and can well afford to pay his 
already retained attorney, Philip Story. 
Utah Code 62A-11-306.1 Is the statute for collecting Child 
Suppport for persons NOT receiving Public Assistance and 
clearly states that the Department has to have a ... 
(a) contract with an Obligee 
(b) person on Public Assistance 
(c) request by agency of another State 
The Department of Office of Recovery Services does not have 
a contract with the Defendant! 
The Defendant Objects to any Intervention by this State; 
whom seeks to violate Defendant's right to due process and 
remedies of her own choosing through a reliable, established 
Court System, 
Defendant PRAYS this Honorable Court to place a Temporary 
Restraining Order against the encroachment of the State 
Attorney General's office in violating their own Statutes 
and In trying to violate Defendant's Constitutionally 
guaranteed rights. 
DATED this day 31 July 1992. 
Respectfully, 
LynnOPoulsen, In Propria Persona 
Iffli^Jd&i ^yhfr/^.r* 
000339 
R. PAUL VAN DAM #3312 
Attorney General 
BY: Renee M. Jimenez 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for State of Utah 
120 North 200 West, 4th Floor 
P. 0. Box 1980 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-1980 
Telephone: (801) 538-4660 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL POULSEN, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ; 
LYNN POULSEN, ] 
Defendant. ] 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
Department of Human Services, 
Intervenor. 
1 ORDER GRANTING STATE'S | MOTION TO INTERVENE 
> Civil No. 914901255 
> Judge DAVID S. YOUNG 
THIS MATTER having come before the Court this day on the 
State of Utah's ex parte Motion to Intervene, and the Court 
having duly considered the same, and being fully advised, now, 
therefore: 
It is hereby ORDERED s follows: 
1. The State of Utah, Department of Human Services (the 
"Department") is joined as an intervenor in this action. 
2. The Department may file a request for relief herein and 
AUG 0 7 1992 
may proceed in furtherance of that request for relief. 
DATED this j^r^y of _a , 1 9 9 2 , 
DAVID S . vTOUNGT £ j 
DISTRICTQZOURT ITUDGE 
r\r\r\o 4r? 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that oric?-JU *~>-day of July, 1992, I 
mailed a true and exact copy of the foregoing Motion and Order to 
Intervene, postage prepaid to the following address(es): 
LYNN POULSEN 
3353 So. Main Street #227 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
MICHAEL POULSEN 
5235 Glendon Street #W1 
Murray, Utah 84123 
DATED this o?^^-^day of July, 1992. 
/^v^/^C^t—" "^JaiZcL^i otvi^. 
Kathleen N. Waterhouse 
SECRETARY 
nnrwfi 
R. PAUL VAN DAM #3312 
Attorney General 
BY: RENEE M. JIMENEZ #5974 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for State of Utah 
120 North 200 West, 4th Floor 
P. 0. Box 1980 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-1980 
Telephone: (801) 538-4660 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL POULSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LYNN POULSEN, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
Department of Human Services, 
Intervenor. 
1 MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER 
1 TO WITHHOLD AND DELIVER 
i Civil No. 914901255 
i Judge DAVID S. YOUNG 
The State of Utah, by and through Renee M. Jimenez, 
Assistant Attorney General, respectfully moves this court to set 
aside the defendant's Order to Withhold and Deliver entered on 
ne 30,^1992 Said motion is made pursuant to Rule 60 (b) (5) 
«LAd 60 (b) (/; of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, for the 
reason that the Order to Withhold and Deliver does not conform to 
the requirements of Utah Code S62A-11-404. 
r . •"rO 
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Additionally, the plaintiff, the obligor in this matter, has 
applied for services with the Office of Recovery Services and the 
defendant's order to Withhold and Deliver is deficient for such 
collection services. The State requests the defendant's order to 
Withhold and Deliver be set aside so the Office of Recovery 
Services may act in accordance with Utah Code 62A-11-404.5. In 
support of its Motion, the State of Utah incorporates the 
attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities. 
««™ s™, », Mft*
 0£ - ^ , 1992 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
fe*uLA- -y>n , 
RENEE M. JIMENEJ 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on c?3r-<-^ day of July, 1992, I mailed a 
true and exact copy of the foregoing Motion to Set Aside, postage 
prepaid, to the following addresses: 
Lynn Poulsen 
3353 South Main Street, #227 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Michael Poulsen 
5235 Glendon Street. #W1 
Murray, Utah 84123 
DATED this g^ 3t/<-^ day of July, 1992. 
KATHLEEN N. WATERHOUSE 
SECRETARY 
R. PAUL VAN DAM #3312 
Attorney General 
BY: RENEE M. JIMENEZ #5974 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for State of Utah 
120 North 200 West, 4th Floor 
P. 0. Box 1980 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-1980 
Telephone: (801) 538-4660 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL POULSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LYNN POULSEN, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
Department of Human Services, 
Intervenor. 
| MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
1 AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
1 MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER 
I TO WITHHOLD AND DELIVER 
1 Civil No. 914901255 
i Judge DAVID S. YOUNG 
The State of Utah, Department of Human Services through its 
attorney, Renee M. Jimenez, Assistant Attorney General submits 
the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of 
its Motion to Set Aside Order to Withhold and Deliver: 
PACTS 
1. The parties to this action were divorced pursuant to a 
Decree of Divorce entered on or about March 27, 1992. 
2. The Decree orders the plaintiff to pay $700.00 per month 
as child support and $200.00 per month as alimony. 
3. The decree also provides that income withholding, 
pursuant to Utah Code S62A-11-404, is authorized as a means of 
collecting said child support. 
4. On June 30, 1992, the court granted the defendant's 
motion for an order to Withhold and Deliver. 
5. On July, 1, 1992 the plaintiff applied for child support 
collection services through the Office of Recovery Services. 
ARGUMENT 
Point It A Valid Order To Withhold Income Under Utah 
Code S62A-11-404 Must Include Certain Provisions. 
Utah Code S62A-11-404, permits an obligee to obtain an order 
of income withholding as a means of collecting delinquent child 
support. However, there are several restrictions associated with 
obtaining such an order. Section 62A-11-403 specifically directs 
that all withheld income shall be submitted to the Office of 
Recovery Services. This requirement is restated in Utah Code 
§62-A-ll-404(c). On June 30, 1992, the court granted the 
defendant's motion for a order to withhold and deliver. Said 
order directs the plaintiff's current employer to withhold and 
deliver to the defendant the sum of $900.00 per month. Allowing 
A A A O O C 
withheld monies to be paid directly to an obligee is in violation 
of the income withholding provisions. 
Utah Code S62A-11-404 (c) also mandates that the court shall 
order that when the payor is notified of a withhold order, a copy 
of the order shall be served upon the office. The defendant's 
order to Withhold and Deliver contains no such provision nor was 
a copy of the defendant's order served upon the Office of 
Recovery Services. Finally, the defendant's order is invalid for 
failing to meet the requirement as stated in Utah Code S62A-11-
404(d). The defendant's order to Withhold and Deliver should 
indicate the circumstances under which the plaintiff may 
terminate the withhold order. 
For the above reasons and because the plaintiff has applied 
for collection services through the Office of Recovery Services 
the State requests that its motion be granted. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this oJ/ day of July, 1992. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
RENEE M. JIMENF 
ASSISTANT ATTC~ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on ^ ^y^day of July, 1992, I mailed a 
true and exact copy of the foregoing Memorandum of Points an 
Authorities, postage prepaid, to the following addresses: 
Lynn Poulsen 
3353 South Main Street, #227 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Michael Poulsen 
5235 Glendon Street. #W1 
Murray, Utah 84123 
DATED this ^3? A^s day of July, 1992. 
KATHLEEN N. WATERHOUSE 
SECRETARY 
jL ?i i? i5 P H '3L 
R. PAUL VAN DAM #3312 
Attorney General 
BY: RENEE M. JIMENEZ #5974 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for State of Utah 
120 North 200 West, 4th Floor 
P. 0. Box 1980 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-1980 
Telephone: (801) 538-4660 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL POULSEN, ] 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LYNN POULSEN, ] 
Defendant. 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
Department of Human Services, 
Intervenor. 
1 NOTICE OF HEARING 
i Civil No. 914901255 DA 
i Judge DAVID S. YOUNG 
PLEASE BE ADVISED that a Hearing on the Motion to Set Aside 
Order to Withhold and Deliver will be held in the above matter on 
WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 19, 1992, AT 9:00 A.M. BEFORE COMMISSIONER 
THOMAS N. ARNETT, JR., at #340 at the Circuit Court Building, 451 
South 200 East, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
DATED this 3? ' day of July, 1992. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
32L 
tENEE M. JIMENI 
Assistant Attorney Gei 000336 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact copy of the 
foregoing Notice of Hearing postage prepaid to the following 
address(es): 
MICHAEL POULSEN 
5235 GLENDON ST #W1 
MURRAY UT 84123 
LYNN POULSEN 
3353 SOUTH MAIN ST #227 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84115 
DATED this ifj^c-day of July, 1992. 
• ^ v ^ y ^ T ^ ^ ~ ^ - ^ _ _ 
KATHLEEN N. WATERHOUSE 
SECRETARY 
0003 
»*v^ -»f* • . - r^;^-*i Tit,!?,*?*? 
Third Judicial District 
AUG 0 7 1992 
Lynn Poulsen -.O^^^TY 
3353 South Main #227 £y ^ " T c l 
Salt Lake City, UTAH 84115 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL POULSEN )RESPONSE TO MOTION TO SET 
PLAINTIFF )AS IDE ORDER TO WITHOLD AND 
JDELIVER AND OR MOTION TO DISMISS 
vs. ) 
)CASE NO. 914901255 
LYNN POULSEN ) 
DEFENDANT )JUDGE YOUNG 
The Defendant responds to State's Motion to Set Aside Order 
to WIthold and Deliver as follows: 
1. State filed Motion to Set Aside on 23 July 1992. 
2. State had not been granted by this Court any permission 
to rightfully Intervene in this Divorce Action. 
3. State cites Utah Code Statute 62A-11-106 (1) as right 
to Intervene as real party interest "to establish, 
modify, and or enforce a Child Support Order11. 
(a) The person to whom the Child Support Is owed Is 
the Defendant who does not authorize nor grant the 
State permission In any way nor authorizes State's 
Intervention. 
(b) The perse *hom may use the State's enforcement 
is someone who Is on "Public Assistance11. Neither 
Defendant nor her Children are on "Public Assistance" 
and neither Is Plaintiff. 
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(c) There Is already a established Court Decree and 
therefore no need of State to "establish11 an Order, 
(d) There Is no need for State to Modify Child Support 
Order as It Is In line with State Statutes. 
(e) There Is no need for State to "enforce" Child 
Support obligation for Plaintiff as Plaintiff Is not 
entitled to Child Support. 
(f) Defendant Is entitled to Child Support and Utah 
Code 62A-11-404 Is authorized, but Defendant or 
"Obligee" does not wish to use Statefs "enforcement" 
but Instead wishes to use her Constitutionally 
Protected Right to the Courts of Competent Jurisdiction 
for "Injuries" to her person, property or reputation" 
(Article I Section 11 of Utah State Constitution). 
Wherefore, Defendant respectfully moves this Court to dismiss the 
State of Utahfs Motion for the following reasons: 
1. The State of Utah lacks proper authorization from 
Intervening In this action. 
2. The State of Utah lacks proper Jurisdiction over this 
matter. 
3. The State of Utah falls as to be properly "joined" In 
this action, at time Statefs Motion was filed. 
4. The State of Utah falls to State a claim upon which 
relief can be granted. 
5. The State of Utah Is not In line with proper 
Legislative Intent 62A-11-101 and therefore Is not 
acting In "Good Faith". 
Respectfully Submitted, 
Tyrfft Poulsen, In Propria Persona 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME, ON , 
*- ,** /-) ^ ~ (as a layman) 
THIS O / ^ 2 DAY OF QxU*c ffg^ — — 
& ^ 
' " i jSS^Si^ NOTARY P u — - . 
t 
SEP 
R. PAUL VAN DAM #3312 
Attorney General 
BY: Renee M. Jimenez 
Assistant Attorney Genejsa.1 
Attorneys for State of Uta! 
120 North 200 West, 4th Floor u 
P. 0. Box 1980 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-1980 
Telephone: (801) 538-4660 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL POULSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LYNN POULSEN, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
Department of Human Services, 
Intervenor. ; 
1 ORDER GRANTING STATE'S 
I MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
i ORDER TO WITHHOLD 
i AND DELIVER 
i Civil No. 914901255 
Judge DAVID S. YOUNG 
The Intervener's motion to set aside order to withhold 
and deliver came regularly for hearing before the domestic 
relations commissioner, Thomas N. Arnett, Jr., in his courtroom 
located at #340 at the Circuit Court Building, 451 South 200 
East, Salt Lake City, Utah, on Wednesday, the 19th day of May, 
1992, at the hour of 9:00 a.m. The plaintiff was present in 
person and represented by himself. The defendant was present in 
person and represented by herself. The State of Utah was 
represented by counsel, Renee M. Jimenez, Assistant Attorney 
General. 
The Court having reviewed the file in this matter, having 
made inquiry of Counsel, plaintiff and defendant and being 
otherwise fully advised in the premises, based on argument in 
open court, now, therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED as follows: 
1. The intervener's motion to set aside the order to 
withhold and deliver, entered on June 30, 1992, is granted. 
2. The Office of Recovery Services is ordered to prepare an 
order of income withholding pursuant to S62A-11-401 et. seq. Utah 
Code Annotated. 
DATED this day of Attjast, 1992. 
APPROVED AND RECOMMENDED! 
MAS 
0*A*~S LCU 
THO N. ARNETT, JR 
Commissioner 
ikfr 
BY THE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the <S ' day of Cw^S' , 
1992/ I mailed a true and exact copy of the foregoing Order on 
Motion to Set Aside Order to Withhold and Deliver, postage 
prepaid, to the following address: 
Lynn Poulsen 
3353 South Main, #227 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Mr. Michael Poulsen 
5235 Glendon St., #W1 
Murray, Utah 84123 
DATED this ^/r/'dav of August, 1992. 
Kathleen N. Waterhouse 
SECRETARY 
u-
o ' ^  
4a. , 
/ 
V 
Lynn Poulsen "l-
3353 South Main #227 K ^ ^ 
Salt Lake City, UTAH 84115 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL POULSEN )MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM 
PLAINTIFF )ORDER GRANTING STATE'S 
)RIGHT TO INTERVENE AND OR 
vs. )SET ASIDE STATE'S MOTION 
)TO SET ASIDE WITHOLD AND 
)DELIVER 
LYNN POULSEN ) 
DEFENDANT )CASE NO. 914901255 
)JUDGE YOUNG 
COMES NOW the Defendant pursuant to URCP 60(b) to motion 
this court for Relief of Order Granting State's Motion to Set 
Aside Withold and Deliver for the following reasons: 
1. The Defendant and the minor children are not now, nor have 
they been on Public Assistance. 
2. The Plaintiff is not now, nor has he been on Public 
Assistance. 
3. The State has not provided any evidence of "good faith" for 
standing in the Court. 
4. The State can show no right or reason to interfere into this 
matter with the exception of a $25.00 application fee. 
5. The Prate did not serve it's Motion on Defendant as 
necessary in RCP - 4. 
6. The State received an Order Granting Intervention Ex-parte 
which can be vacated or modified for not serving personally 
the opposing party as required RCP Rule 7 (b)(2). 
000427 
The State is relying on a Legislative Statute that would 
pertain to most people who receive some kind of benefit from 
the State. 
The Defendant and her minor children have received no 
benefits from the State of Utah, nor can the State provide 
proof of any "benefits" to Defendant and the minor children, 
therefore the statute does not apply to Defendant. 
The Defendant is a bona fide citizen of the State of Utah 
and therefore has certain rights guaranteed to her by the 
Utah State Constitution which include Article I Section 11 
"ALL courts shall be open to, and every person, for an 
injury done to him in his person, property or reputation 
shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be 
administered without denial..." 
The State's Motion to Set Aside was never sent or served on 
Defendant and therefore she has been denied due process. 
The Defendant was never given Notice of Hearing for "right 
to intervene" and therefore asks for relief from such 
intervention until the State can prove an "interest and an 
injury" into Defendant's affairs. 
The Defendant has the right to privacy, therefore the State 
has no right to intervene into Defendant's lawfully obtained 
Support Obligations 
The Defendant has a right to the enjoyment of her conscience 
and the Defendant has a religious conviction against 
participation in any Public Assistance Programs. 
THEREFORE the Defendant PRAYS this Honorable Court to 
relieve Defendant of Order Granting State's intervention and also 
relief from Order Granting States Motion to Set Aside the Wlthold 
and Deliver of her choice and her own remedy throught the Courts 
and Grants Defendant the right to have the Wlthold and Deliver 
dated 30 June 1992 by Judge Young to stay in place. 
Dated this 1st day of September 1992. 
Respectfully, 
flMryxAfirf*^ rfl/SL4Ar**K^ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on 1 September 1992, I mailed a true 
and exact copy, by first class mail, postage pre-paid, of the 
foregoing Motion for Hearing, Motion for Relief, and Affidavit in 
Support to: Michael Poulsen, 5335 Glendon Street W-l, Murray, 
Utah 84123 and Attorneys for State of Utah, P.O. Box 1980, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84110-1980. 
(fad?* Sirl/&t,!/* 
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SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
POULSEN, MICHAEL D 
VS 
POULSEN, LYNN J 
PLAINTIFF 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 914901255 DA 
DATE 09/22/92 
HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG 
COURT REPORTER 
COURT CLERK NP 
TYPE OF HEARING: 
PRESENT: 
P. ATTY. POULSEN, MICHAEL 
D. ATTY. POULSEN, LYNN 
THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM THE ORDER GRANTING 
THE STATE'S REQUEST TO INTERVENE IS DENIED. THIS MINUTE ENTRY 
WILL BE SIGNED SO NO FURTHER ORDER NEEDS TO BE PREPARED BY THESE 
PRO SE PARTIES. 
C.C. TO THE PARTIES, PRO SE //£" 
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